ABSTRACT
     This paper is about a project on the reintegration of child soldiers into society, which was implemented in Angola until civil war broke out again 1998. The goal of the project was to achieve Human Capacity Development in certain areas of the country. The project is analyzed by using different frameworks through which it is possible to establish to what degree Human Capacity Development was attained in Angola.

THE PROJECT
     The Project of Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Angola, conceived and implemented by the Christian Children's Fund (CCF, an international non-governmental organization) between September 1996 and August 1998 with the financial support of USAID and UNICEF, is a very good example of Human Capacity Development.
     The general goal of the project was to contribute to the psychological and social reintegration of minors who were involved in the civil war in Angola. The specific objectives were: to contribute to the psychological well being of the demobilized child soldiers from the two armies (the government and UNITA - União Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola - the rebels); to sensitize and mobilize the communities where the minors would be reintegrated; to promote the rights of the demobilized children and support their social, occupational and educational reintegration; and to contribute to the involvement of local leaders (such as traditional heads of village and religious leaders) to help make children's reintegration a success.
     The project was implemented in the wake of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol between the Angolan government and UNITA forces with the mediation of Portugal, the United States and Zambia. Both parties agreed on the reintegration of child soldiers into society. At the time of the project, there were 9,133 child soldiers registered, 520 of which were from FAA (Fourth Branch of the Angolan Armed Forces) and 8,613 from UNITA. Four hundred and ninety-one were incorporated in the FAA, 5,171 were demobilized and 3,471 were called "Open File" because they were not in the quartering areas when the demobilization process started.
     The CCF project consisted of four phases. (1) Preparation: the organization elaborated the concepts required to justify the need for the reintegration process (i.e. rights of child soldiers). (2) Quartering: the NGO identified the soldiers to reintegrate, started to find their families, provided medical examinations and food aid, and developed civic training for the participation of the entire community. (3) Reunification: CCF organized the reunification of the child soldiers with their families. (4) Social reintegration: it took place in cooperation with SeCor, IRSEM, and UNICEF.
     To evaluate the program it is vital to take into consideration the context in which CCF operated. Communities became dependent upon external aid overtime. Their livelihoods were NOT self-sufficient, NOT sustainable. It is not clear whether there was indigenous knowledge on which to built or not. The civil war had taken over, devastating the country. Policy structures were nonexistent, since the conflict had destroyed and degraded Angola's social and economic infrastructures. Therefore, science and technology were not part of Angolans' everyday life.
     CCF also had to face problems with loss or alteration of cultural values and passive acceptance of other cultural practices. In addition, it had to deal with reduced adult tolerance of children's problems.
     Several assumptions were also made. It was believed that Angola would finally know peace and economic and social stability. However, there would be problems in making the communities identified accept the reintegration of child soldiers. That is why their involvement from the very beginning (by giving them participation opportunities that would be fully available and accessible) was a key factor. Finally, to make the project succeed each partner would execute their part. That is what made the approach to the problem holistic and integrated.
     To evaluate the project I will start with the 5 Hs: home, health, hunger, helpers, and headmasters. All these elements were present in the project. CCF took fully into account the importance of the first component, a home. CCF prepared questionnaires to be completed by both child soldiers and their families. Several indicators were used to measure the data: scale of exposure to the war; scale of impact of the war on the children; individual records on the progress of the demobilized minor; filing the tracing of the family; registration at the meeting point; model of the monthly report; and file on the monthly register of work of the CCF contact.
     CCF workers went to the houses of child soldiers to prepare (through interviews and the just mentioned questionnaire) their families for reintegration. Initially, the visits occurred every other week, then monthly, finally bi-monthly. CCF also informed the families of the arrival dates of the demobilized children through announcements on the radio and at religious ceremonies. One of the key factors for the reunion was the choice of the meeting point, which mainly depended on the questionnaire that the families filled out. The meeting point was usually in front of parishes, schools and other safe places. The major concern was the safety of the children. Moreover, churches were among the few social structures that had managed to survive all over the country throughout the war.
     However, CCF had to come up with alternatives in case the families did not show up. For example, substitute families, children's relatives, or other individuals were identified as alternative solutions. CCF was still in the area when 2,153 child soldiers were reunited with their families, which was 52.46 percent of the entire child soldiers' population located in the seven provinces where the project was implemented (Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huila, Malange, Moxico, and Uige-Kamabatela).
     In regard to health, CCF provided child soldiers with medical examination prior to their reintegration. As for hunger, the organization also provided food to give relief to particularly needy children and families. Helpers were identified, too. CCF chose some 200 religious activists to identify and reunite child soldiers with their families in 116 "comunas," the smallest administrative division in the country, of 60 municipalities in the seven provinces where 85 percent of the demobilized child soldiers were.
     Moreover, CCF developed civic training to involve the communities in the process. They organized 86 meetings (six in Benguela, 20 in Bié, five in Huambo, seven in Huila, 23 in Malange, eight in Moxico and 17 in Uige) with the local population, inviting church members, political leaders from UNITA and/or from the Angolan government, local leaders and ordinary people. In some cases, only leaders were invited for security reasons. Community participation was considered very important by CCF. However, due to time constraints (rather than security problems) leadership was at times preferred. Overall, these gatherings were well attended despite the pervasive climate of fear.
     Headmasters were very active, too. Besides CCF, USAID and UNICEF, a network was created in order to coordinate the work with other organizations in other Angolan provinces. Such organizations were ACF (UK), Caritas, WFP (World Food Programme), Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) and SECOR. They started being active in Angola after November 1995, when the National Program for Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers was created. It involved UCAH Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid to Angola, IOM (International Organization of Migration), Save the Children Fund (UK) and other NGOs, along with those already mentioned.
     The network was very active. A workshop of headmasters on the psychological status of demobilized child soldiers was held in Luanda on February 27, 1998. Participants included Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH), MINARS, the Ministry of Education, UNICEF, IRSEM-SECOR, SCF (UK), Médico Internacional and the Director of USAID in Angola.
     The government of Angola donated money to be paid in three installments: the first on the day of demobilization; the second after four months; and the third after eight months. The government of Portugal (Angola was one of its colonies until 1975, when it gained independence) donated kits consisting of a radio, batteries, a T-shirt, a hat or beret, and a cartoon book.
     Overall, the program was a success. It was possible to reunite 1,500 children with their families. CCF was particularly successful in the province of Moxico for various reasons, mainly because this province was the last one where demobilization took place. Thus, activists had more time to identify the families.
     The most difficult province was Huambo, where UNITA had its headquarters (Bailumbo). Plus, it was there where demobilization of child soldiers started. So, activists had less time to locate the families, making the reunification very hard to achieve. The most common obstacles that CCF encountered were: limited access to certain areas; non-motorized transportation (bicycles); some families had moved; and lack of information compiled in the registers in the quartering locations.
     Despite the success of this holistically integrated project, some criticism can be addressed. First of all, the health-related conditions of child soldiers are not specifically described in the report. More specifically, nothing is said about what kind of alimentation child soldiers were subject to prior to reunification with their families. Thus, it is impossible to say what kind of role health and hunger (the second and third elements of the 5 Hs framework) played in the entire process. The report only says that WFP donated food for resettlement and reintegration to be given on the day of demobilization and for a period of nine months. But it does not say how the food was given out. Equity of distribution was not an issue, according to the report.
     In addition, it is impossible to establish from the report whether poor health conditions and hunger contributed to the partial failure of the program in the province of Huambo. According to documented sources, the presence of UNITA in the province has been an obstacle towards the demobilization of child soldiers. Promises of good food and good medications may have "convinced children to stay." It may just be a hypothesis, but it is worth taking into consideration.
     The role of helpers is a little bit confusing, too. CCF chose some 200 religious activists for the identification and reunification of child soldiers with their families. CCF also invited religious activists (along with other local leaders) to the meetings held to enhance the importance of community participation. One could assume that there was a diversification in religious activism. This aspect is not well developed in the report.
     Overall, the 5 Hs framework has proved that the program was successful because it involved many sectors of the "loving society" child soldiers were welcomed to. CCF adopted a holistically integrated approach, which was the password to success.
     The framework that best fits (after the 5 Hs) the CCF project is the 3 Cs: coordination, comprehensiveness, and continuity. As for coordination, CCF failed to communicate properly with the families. According to the report, 26 percent of the child soldiers were received at the meeting points by their families, 9.5 percent by local authorities and 64.5 percent by activities, which means that 74 percent of the families did not show up at the meeting points. Despite the fact that the information was given out on the radio, not many families heard the announcements. Moreover, the information was often misleading since the arrival dates would constantly change. At times, families had transportation problems, especially because bridges had been destroyed during the conflict.
     Of all child soldiers who were helped by CCF, only 53 did not reunite with their families because they could not be found. However, these children were accepted by new, loving families in the same provinces they were from.
     Those who did meet with their families experienced incredibly moving moments. Even the fact that some of the children had fought for the enemy did not matter. (CCF feared that some families would not accept back their children because of that.) Those moments erased the lack of coordination between the CCF staff and helpers on one side and the families on the other.
     As for comprehensiveness, many sectors of the "loving society" were involved in the process. However, the importance and involvement of religious leaders seems to have overshadowed the contribution of other kinds of activists. This apparent "imbalance" was required by the specific situation, though. The religious structure is the most stable in Angola, a country where civil war has been reigning for more than two decades.
     As for continuity, there was follow up after the reunification between the child soldiers and their families. In this phase CCF played such an important role that some children ended up considering CCF staff godparents or guardians. Home visits were organized to evaluate the progress the minors had made. The former child soldiers started being involved with church groups, which organized cultural and educational activities to reinforce the reintegration of minors in the "loving society." Moreover, evaluation of the impact of the war experience on children's new life occurred.
     However, not all reintegrated children were followed up. Sixty-one percent of those reintegrated where CCF was active did not have any contacts with the activists. Some of them could not be found after being reintegrated. The main reason for this was the fact that many areas had become extremely dangerous due to political and military instability. Like reintegration, the follow-up process was particularly unsuccessful in the province of Huambo. There, 68.6 percent of reintegrated children had not follow-up at all.
     In some other areas, the follow-up phase was considerably successful, though. Quick Impact Projects were implemented to ensure the social integration of the demobilized children. Three bakeries were built, and 12 demobilized child soldiers started baking bread monitored by a master baker in October 1998. Despite the fact that the number of followed-up minors increased over the two years during which the project was implemented, the rate remained constant at 37-38 percent. Moreover, due to the resurgence of the war in 1998 obtaining data became impossible and almost all the contacts were terminated. Until that time, all the follow-up data had been collected on individual record cards. Until 1998, 67.13 percent of them had been filled in just once, 18 percent twice, 9 percent three times, and only 6 percent four times.
     So, continuity failed, but for external circumstances that CCF could not control. Nothing can be blamed on the organization. Overall, the implementation of the 3 Cs approach shows a successfully designed project that could take advantage of the situation (the massive use of religious activists). The civil war did not let CCF have a broad range of action. However, CCF was able to be successful up to the point where children were monitored for a certain period of time. The resurgence of the war between the two warring parties prevented CCF from being productive any further.
     A major flaw of the project is visible by implementing the 4 Ps framework: practice, project, program, and policy. The practice is what CCF wanted to see at the household level, the reintegration of demobilized child soldiers. The project is what CCF designed to see the practice occur. The program is the number of projects that all the international organizations and NGOs involved implemented throughout Angola.
     However, what is here missing is a policy. In the entire CCF report there is no reference to the possibility for implementing the program in another country with similar circumstances. In Sierra Leone, for example, child soldiers are a major problem. This possibility does not seem to have been contemplated. The only piece of information worth mentioning is a database that was supposed to be shared with some partners. However, the CCF report does not specify either the kind of partners or when it was meant to occur.

CONCLUSION
     The program would keep receiving new criticism as implementing new frameworks. By doing so it would be possible to have a better picture of what the project REALLY achieved, and where it REALLY failed. If one applied ALL the frameworks to evaluate the CCF project, one would have the complete puzzle. However, prioritizing is what really counts. Even though I applied ONLY three frameworks, the lessons for human capacity developments deriving from this project are immediately clear. (1) CCF: this NGO has played a key role in the reintegration of child soldiers into society. The growing and successful involvement of NGOs in the field has become a trademark of Human Capacity Development. (2) Community participation: we can't forget, however, this other important element. The reintegration of child soldiers is not only the result of the efforts made by a single organization. Without the involvement of different sectors of the local community, projects would die as NGOs withdraw. Projects would not be sustainable. (3) Sustainability: in this specific case, the war has prevented the project from being implemented any further. However, in Angola people still hope for a better future. CCF has made a difference in the lives of many children and their families. We can only hope that the project will be soon resumed.

This paper is the result of a class, Human Capacity Development, that Margherita Serafini took at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS).

Margherita Serafini is a graduate student at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. She is also a graduate assistant for Prof. Morgan, dean of the Graduate School of International Policy Studies, at MIIS. margherita.serafini@miis.edu

SOURCES
     CCF Project on the Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Angola, www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABQ994.pdf.