Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2007. "Prestige from the Provision of Collective Goods." Social Forces 85:1765-1786.

Abstract: Groups often confer high prestige on individuals even when few members of the group ever interact with those individuals. To account for this phenomenon, I present a multilevel simulation model of a group’s selection of its top-ranked member. In the model, the mechanism for social agreement on a top person is aggregation of group members’ private acceptance of that rank due to the person’s likely provision of a collective benefit. The simulation shows this process can generate group consensus on a top person, even in large groups in which there is no consensus on who has the most ability. It also generates predictions, such as that large groups will grant prestige primarily for nonrival benefits.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2006. "Presidential Power over Supreme Court Decisions." Public Choice 127(1-2):97-121.

Abstract: I calculate U.S. presidents’ power and power use concerning the ideological direction of U.S. Supreme Court decisions through their ability to appoint replacements to the Court, over the period 1946 through 2001. I test hypotheses concerning factors affecting appointment power and power use, and examine their effect on Senate confirmation votes. Of nine presidents, four have had the ability to affect the direction of more than 25 percent of Court decisions for sustained periods of time. Strongly ideological power use in appointment is found for four also. Senate confirmation votes have tended to be more favorable when the president has more appointment power.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. and Cynthia N. Yeingst. 2006. "A Dynamic Model of Friendly Association Networks." Social Science Research 35:642-667.

Abstract: We propose a dynamic model of the formation and maintenance of large friendly association networks (FANs), which incorporates a theoretically based actor model and is implemented via computer simulation. We apply the dynamic model to 18 FANs, some with over 900 members, documented by James Coleman. Structural measures for these networks show them to share some but not all structural characteristics of other large networks. With appropriate settings of its parameters, the dynamic model generates networks with structural measures that fit closely those of the Coleman networks, which suggests the model provides a plausible explanation for their structure. The parameter settings in turn have implications for characteristics of friendship processes and the individuals in the empirical networks..

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2004. “Past and Future Applications of Jasso's Justice Theory.” Sociological Theory 22(3):432-444.

Abstract: Past applications of Jasso’s theory of justice evaluation, including several applied tests, generally support the theory but raise questions future applications should address. These include whether the theory might predict as well or better if the good in question is something other than income, and if it would predict third-party evaluations as well or better than first-party evaluations. Moreover, the theory could be used for more demanding applications: interventions, which would involve changing the situation in order to affect justice evaluations. The theory itself suggests three means of effecting such interventions.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2004. “The Group Control Catastrophe.” Sociological Perspectives 47(1):109-129.

Abstract: This study elaborates a surprising finding by Heckathorn (1990). His simulation model of group-mediated social control models a situation in which an agent outside a group tries to obtain compliance by group members through administering sanctions. The surprising finding is that under certain conditions, while group compliance generally increased as the agent’s monitoring efficacy increased, for intermediate values of the monitoring efficacy it collapsed to zero. In this study I show this is part of a catastrophe, a bifurcation into two equilibria for intermediate values of monitoring efficacy. Whether the group exists at a high compliance or low compliance equilibrium depends on the occurrence of temporary simultaneous non-payoff-maximizing cooperation or defection. Cooperation pushes the group to the high compliance equilibrium; defection knocks it to the low compliance equilibrium. The catastrophe is robust, existing for a range of parameter values, and for different production functions for the public good, benefits from group compliance.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2003. "The Mathematics of Expectation States Theory." Social Psychology Quarterly 66:238-253.

Abstract: Since 1977, performance expectations, the central concept of expectation states theory (EST), has been calculated using a graph model. I restate that model as a single equation, which as inputs takes only (1) relevance of status characteristics, and (2) counts of the number of characteristics at different levels of relevance. The equation model is useful for deriving deductions from EST, which I demonstrate by showing that status characteristics do not always have declining marginal effect, and by re-examination of Fisek’s Familiarity Theorem. The equation model also should be useful for incorporating performance expectations into other mathematical models, which I demonstrate by showing how it may be incorporated into Skvoretz and Fararo’s dynamic model of hierarchy formation. Finally, I show that extensions to the basic graph model of EST, such as allowing sources of performance evaluations, can be incorporated easily into the equation model.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2002. "A Deductive Approach to Friendship Networks." The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 26:147-165.

Abstract: Based on a simple actor model, I derive theory concerning satisfied networks of close, reciprocal friendships. By satisfied networks I mean networks of actors who would be unhappier with more or fewer close friends. Deductions concern characteristics of such networks, such as that a satisfied network component (connected subnetwork) containing an actor with only one friend must be a dyad. I show that the model of satisfied friendship networks fits eight empirical friendship networks significantly better than a random model. Finally, I show the theory’s usefulness by making five additional predictions, including two involving intervention.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2002. "Elites and Popular Nationalism." British Journal of Sociology 53(3):321-341.

Abstract: Much current theory concerning nationalism holds that elites commonly create or cause popular nationalism. In part, that thesis may be due to an overwhelming emphasis in research on nationalism on positive cases: cases where nationalism has appeared, ignoring cases where it has not. In this article, I challenge the thesis by showing numerous historical cases in which elites have promoted nationalisms that ordinary people have not adopted, or in which ordinary people have adopted a nationalism before it was taken up by elites. Even if elites do not create popular nationalism, however, they can and do shape its expression in a variety of ways, such as organizing it, providing relevant information, or providing opportunity or incentive for it. I show this through historical examples.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2002. "The Compliance You Need For A Cost You Can Afford: How To Use Individual and Collective Sanctions." Social Science Research 31:630-652.

Abstract: In many naturally occurring situations, actors (agents) use individual sanctions or collective sanctions or both to obtain compliance from members of a group. Individual sanctions are sanctions applied to each individual based on that individual’s perceived behavior; collective sanctions are sanctions to all group members based on perceived behavior by some group members. Often there are constraints on the amount of sanctions an agent may use. I use Heckathorn's (1990) sequential decision model of group-mediated social control to analyze the power of an agent concerning compliance by group members under such constraints. Results show that whether positive or negative sanctions are considered, the amount of group compliance is an increasing but non-linear step function of the looseness of the constraints. Moreover, it appears that the most cost-effective use of power entails using only collective sanctions when lower levels of compliance are sought, only individual sanctions when higher levels of compliance are sought, and never mixing the two.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2001. "Measuring Power in Exchange Networks." Sociological Perspectives 44(2):141-162.

Abstract: A key scope condition of most theory and research on exchange networks is that network members try to maximize profit. This implies that members’ behavior will try to use maximally one type of power: power concerning own interests. I specify a measure for power concerning own interests (P_OI), as a particular specification of a more general measure for social power. P_OI can be determined analytically, conditional on fully competent actors. This conditional P_OI can be used as a baseline for comparison with empirical results, as well to predict what may obtain for a network of experienced and skillful members. I calculate conditional P_OI for two reciprocal exchange networks studied experimentally by Molm (1997). Analysis shows that P_OI is related in complex ways to power over others’ outcomes (P_OO) and power over others’ behavior (P_OB), thus implying that experimental networks with the scope condition of profit-maximizing actors may be ill-suited to assess P_OO and P_OB. Comparison with empirical results shows that participants were far from competent in use of rewards, although fairly competent in their (lack of) use of punishment.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2000. "Power through Appointment." Social Science Research 29:535-555.

Abstract: The ability to appoint members to a formally constituted group may confer power. That is, through appointment an actor may be able to affect decisions made by the group and to further the actor=s own interests. This article analyzes the effects of a number of factors on such power, including population proportions favoring different goals, size of decision-making group, size of pool of potential appointees, and decision-making procedure in the group. Analysis suggests that power through appointment is important; under many conditions, it allows the appointer to control ten percent or more of the variation in the outcome. Other conclusions include that a voting procedure gives the appointer more power than a turn-taking procedure for groups of more than two members when population proportions of goals are not extreme, and that power concerning the appointer=s own interests generally does not parallel power concerning group decisions when more than two goals are relevant.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2000. "Effects of Positive Reputation Systems." Social Science Research 29:188-207.

Abstract: For a given population of potential trustees—actors or objects in whom others may seek to place trust—a positive reputation system is a formalized or institutionalized procedure or process by which a particular positive reputation is acquired or lost. Positive reputation systems are common in modern society. Examples include awarding of certifications, awards, credentials, and positive reviews. This study mathematically derives effects of two general characteristics of such systems—how easy it is to get a reputation and how effective the reputation is at discriminating between cooperators and non- cooperators—in the context of a third factor, the proportion of cooperators in the population. Some findings are as follows. The gain in confidence from a potential trustee having a reputation is a U-shaped function of reputation ease, with maximum depending on proportion of cooperators in the population. For potential trustees with a positive reputation, and trustors seeking and able to make deals with a limited number of trustees with positive reputations, the reputation is worth more the harder it is to get. However, when reputation effectiveness is moderate to high, the worth of a potential trustee with a positive reputation compared to the worth of a potential trustee without one becomes maximal when reputation is easy. The study also suggests a way to model continuous positive reputation systems—ones in which positive reputations are acquired gradually, as through amassing references.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 2000. "Reconstructing with Care and with Science." Journal of Socio-Economics 29:243-246.

Cook, Karen S. and Joseph M. Whitmeyer. 2000. "Richard M. Emerson." Pp. 486-512 in The Blackwell Companion to Major Social Theorists, edited by G. Ritzer. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1999. "Convex Preferences and Power Inequality in Exchange Networks: An Experimental Study." Rationality and Society 11(4):419-442.

Abstract: Early theorizing of power in exchange networks, by Homans and Emerson, was based explicitly on the principle that the more of a resource an actor acquires, the less the actor will value additional units of the resource. However, no previous empirical studies of effects of exchange network structure on power have embodied this principle. Generalizing the principle to convexity of actors= preferences, this study is the first to do so. This study experimentally tests the prediction that under specified conditions power inequalities will result in a Line3 (A linked to B linked to C) exchange network where actors= preferences are convex although the network is not characterized by the structural property of exclusion. That is, in the experimental network, linked actors divide pools of resources under exchange rules that mean that all actors can exchange with benefit with all other actors to whom they are linked. Payoffs to resources are specified by a function that operationalizes convexity of preferences. Results support the prediction: the central actor is advantaged in this situation. These results imply that convexity of preferences should be incorporated into theory and research concerning power in exchange networks.

Webster, Murray, Jr. and Joseph M. Whitmeyer. 1999. "A Theory of Second-Order Expectations and Behavior." Social Psychology Quarterly 62(1):17-31.

Abstract: Social psychologists recognize that what we think others expect of our performance can affect our own expectations and behavior. However to date no theoretical explanation fully integrates others' ("second-order") expectations with the much better understood effects of actors' own ("first order") expectations. We propose a theoretical extension and a corresponding mathematical model that incorporate effects of second-order expectations. We believe that second-order expectations affect actors' expectation states and the power and prestige structure of groups, but the magnitude of those effects depends on the status structure of the group. We outline possible variant ways second-order expectations function, and the design of a differentiating experiment to assist further theory development.

Skvoretz, John, Murray Webster, Jr., and Joseph M. Whitmeyer. 1999. "Status Orders in Task Discussion Groups." Pp. 199-218 in Advances in Group Processes, edited by S. R. Thye, E. J. Lawler, M. M. Macy, H. A. Walker. Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1999. "Interest-Network Structures in Exchange Networks." Sociological Perspectives 42:23-47.

Abstract: Studies of power in exchange networks have concentrated overwhelmingly on how the power distribution in the network is affected by the network structure. In this article I look at how one type of interest-network structure--the distribution of interest coincidence among network members--affects the power distribution in exchange networks. All exclusionary networks--networks where power differences stem from differential ability to exclude exchange partners from exchange--have assumed an interest-network structure of homogeneous interests among network members. All connected actors have opposing interests within exchange; when one partner does better the other does worse. Here I allow connected pairs of actors to vary in the degree to which their interests are opposing or coincident. This creates the possibility of a wide variety of structures of interest coincidence in exchange networks. Using two different methods--an analytic method derived from power-dependence principles, and a modification of a widely used computer program simulating exchange in networks--I show that, given the assumptions embodied in those methods, the interest-network structure of interest coincidence can have substantial effects on the power rankings of network members.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1998. "A Human Actor Model for Social Science." Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 28:403-434.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1998. "A Program for Calculating P(s) in Complex, Symmetric Status Structures." Current Research in Social Psychology 3:64-68 <http://www.uiowa.edu/~grpproc>.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1998. "On the Relationship between Memes and Genes: A Critique of Dennett." Biology and Philosophy 13(2):187-204.

Abstract: Dennett (1995) argues that memes or cultural replicators are largely autonomous of genes, and that they are fairly efficacious in determining who we are and what we do. I argue that Dennett's arguments are wrong in several aspects, which we can see by analyzing processes at appropriate levels. Specifically, I argue that it is not true that we as persons are created largely by memes, that our memes are not largely independent of our genes, and that we can use the universality of memes to make inferences about genetic predispositions. Finally, by suggesting an innate psychological mechanism for morality, I argue that morality may be largely the effect of genetic predispositions rather than autonomous.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1997. "Ethnic Succession in a Highland Chiapas Community." Rural Sociology 62(3):454-473.

Abstract: In the past half century, in several indígena (Indian) communities of highland Chiapas, Mexico, a transformation in ethnic relations toward greater equality and less antagonism between the formerly dominant mestizos (ladinos) and the formerly dominated indígenas has taken place. I describe this change, along with improvements in ethnic relations it produced, for one highland community, Tenejapa. I show that one important cause of this phenomenon of ethnic succession was the imparting to indígenas of skills for the mestizo world by the national agency INI (Instituto Nacional Indigenista). This transfer of skills constitutes a type of power, often overlooked because of its long-term and subtle nature, that can have significant effects. However, INI=s use of this power depended on the fact that the state government neither strongly obstructed INI=s action nor carried out this action itself. Material is drawn from field research I conducted in 1990-91 and followup research in 1994.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1997. "Mann's Theory of Power--A Sympathetic Critique." British Journal of Sociology 48:210-225.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1997. "Endogamy as a Basis for Ethnic Behavior." Sociological Theory 15(2):162-178.

Abstract: In this article I argue for endogamy as a fundamental cause of human behavior that is often classified as ethnic. Specifically, I show that it would make evolutionary sense for people to help possible co-progenitors of their descendants. This suggests that in many situations people will help preferentially the minimal endogamous set of people to which they belong. Such help mostly will be restricted to providing benefits that are nearly 'non-rival'--benefits which group members can 'consume' without making others consume less. This (partial) explanation of pro-ethny behavior reconciles key points from various approaches to ethnicity. It also agrees with many empirical observations, such as the link between endogamy and ethnicity and the variability of criteria for ethnicity. This explanation yields predictions and explanations in a number of problematic areas. For example, it suggests that expansion of the marriage pool, often occurring as a result of urbanization, is a crucial factor in the transformation of local identities into nationalism.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1997. "Applying General Equilibrium Analysis and Game Theory to Exchange Networks." Current Research in Social Psychology 2:13-23 <http://www.uiowa.edu/~grpproc>.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1997. "The Power of the Middleman--A Theoretical Analysis." The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 22(1):59-90.

Abstract: I present a technique, multiple general equilibrium analysis (multiple GEA), based on Coleman's (1990) general equilibrium analysis (GEA), for determining the distribution of power among members of a positively connected network in which middlemen mediate the transfer of resources. In line with earlier simulation and experimental studies, multiple GEA indicates that middlemen actors gain considerable power and resources from their structural position. Results also show that, under the assumptions of multiple GEA, actors' relative power can vary considerably depending on the configuration of actor interests. Unlike previous uses of GEA to analyze such networks, the results follow without needing to use ad hoc factors, or to give middlemen actors initial control over any resource.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1997. "Contrasting Trait Adjectives as Distinct Psychological Entities." Psychological Reports 80:739-743.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. and Rosemary L. Hopcroft. 1996. "Community, Capitalism, and Rebellion in Chiapas." Sociological Perspectives 39(4):517-538.

Abstract: In this paper, we examine the role of local land tenure, community solidarity, and recent commercialization in the 1994 rebellion in Chiapas. We find that neither the ejido land tenure system, nor community solidarity, nor community disruption and proletarianization due to recent economic change, may be considered as primary causal factors behind the revolt. We find the best explanation for the revolt to lie in the desire of certain groups, notably immigrants to the Lacondón rain forest area, for land, and in recent changes in land tenure law which have ended their hopes of acquiring land. The primary effect of economic change was indirect. It promoted population growth, which has led to increasing pressure on land.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1996. "Eccentricity and Indulgence in Autocratic Rulers." Sociological Perspectives 39(1):59-83.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1994. "Social Structure and the Actor--The Case of Power in Exchange Networks." Social Psychology Quarterly 57(3):177-189.

Whitmeyer, Joseph M. 1994. "Why Actor Models are Integral to Structural Analysis." Sociological Theory 12(2):153-165.

Cook, Karen S. and Joseph M. Whitmeyer. 1992. "Two Approaches to Social Structure: Exchange Theory and Network Analysis." Annual Review of Sociology 18:109-127.

Schmitt, David R. and Joseph M. Whitmeyer. 1990. "Effects of Risky Alternatives on Human Choice." Psychological Reports 67:699-702.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. and Joseph M. Whitmeyer. 1990. "Social Class and Reproductive Success." International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 27:29-48.

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